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The Battle for Flue: Casualty and Disease Rates During Urban Warfare Renewed nationalism with the ending of Huong River into two main sections (See the Cold War has yielded an explosion in Figure 1 )'. The area south of the river was internecine strife between countries or re-residential and also included City Hall, Hue gions which were once united. Hostilities University, the train station, a Military Asbetween Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey sistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) comand Kurdistan, Pakistan and India, rival pound and other administrative agencies. clan leaders within Somalia, and Yugosla-The area north of the river contained the via and the surrounding republics have all walled portion of Hue known as the Citadel. erupted with deadly consequences, At the The Citadel was surrounded by canals and same time, the world community has put moats and was the site of the imperial palincreasing pressure on the United Nations ace. The barrier around the Citadel formed (U.N.) to take on the roles of disarming a 2,500 meter square and consisted of an troops and "enforcing" peace in addition to outer stone wall five meters high and one to its traditional peacekeeping function of three meters thick, as well as an inner wall monitoring cease-fire lines, separated by dirt fill. In addition to the When opposing sides are intransigent, imperial palace, the Citadel contained an peacemaking or peace-enforcing may re-airport, houses, markets, and a large numquire U.N.-led military troops to forcibly ber of buildings. The North Vietnamese end hostilities and impose a settlement be-Army (NVA) infiltrated the city and took tween warring factions. Further, the use of control as part of the Tet Offensive at the such military force will at times likely need end of January, 1968. The urban assault that to be applied to cities and villages where followed required the use of three Marine one faction is firmly established. There-infantry battalions and 13 South Vietnamfore, it is quite possible that U.S. Marines, ese battalions and lasted for one month.2, 3 ,4 in addition to their amphibious power pro-Given this duration and requisite force, the jection and crisis response functions, may Hue operation has applicability to estimatbe called upon to participate in an U.N. ing the levels of casualties which might be operation in which a goal is to force an sustained in a U.N.-led military operation evtrenched enemy from an urban setting.
within an urban environment. The present investigation examines rates of casualties and disease incidence incurred METHOD by U.S. Marines in the retaking of the city of Hue during the Vietnam Conflict. Hue was Medical incidence data were extracted the ancient imperial capital and cultural seat from Unit Diaries of the three U.S. Marine of Vietnam. The city was divided by the infantry battlions(I/l/1, 1/51, 2/5/11)which participated in the Battle for Hue. Unit tained during the assault on Okinawa are Diaries, which are housed at Records Ser. shown in Figure 3 . The daily wounded rate vice Section, Headquarters U.S. Marine during the Okinawa assault was 6.57 per Corps, Quantico, VA, include the numberof 1000 strength and ranged from 0.0 to 31.8. wounded in action (WIA), killed in action The daily KIA rate was 1.35 and varied (KIA), Disease/Nonbattle Injuries (DNBI), between 0.0 and 6.4. Also shown for comdates of the casualties, and unit strength. parison purposes are the pulses and pauses Daily rates of wounded, killed, and DNBI in casualty incidence during the four-month incurred during the re-taking of Hue were period in which Marine involvement peaked computed and contrasted with pre-and post-in Vietnam (See Figure 4) . The daily Hue operations. Casualty and DNBI rates wounded rate during this period was 2.50, were calculated per 1000 strength per day. ranging from 0.0 to 13.9 while the KIA rate Additionally, rates of casualties and DNBI was 0.31. were examined for three separate phases of Daily casualty incidence among troops the operation in which U.S. Marines were involved in fighting irn the urban area south involved: 1) Fighting south of the Huong of the river are graphed in Figure 5 . The River, 2) Fighting in the Inner Citadel, and daily wounded rate during this firstphase of 3) Pursuit and "mopping up". Rates during the battle was 37.9 per 1000 strength, while the Hue battle were also contrasted with the KIA rate was 3.1. The average strength casualty incidence of the four-month period during this eight-day period was 755 troops. of peak U.S. Marine involvement in Viet- Figure 6 is a display of the casualty rates for nam (May through August 1968), as well as the five individual companies fighting south with rates sustained during the high inten-of the river; all but one company had a sity assault on Okinawa (April through June wounded rate which exceeded 35 per 1000 1945). Muster Rolls, from which the strength per day. Okinawa data were extracted, are main- Figure 7 shows the daily casualty incitained at the National Archives, Washing-dence among Marines fighting inside the ton D.C.
Citadel during the second phase of the battle for Hue. The wounded rate during this ten-RESULTS day period was 44.4 per 1000 strength per day, while the KIA rate was 7.8. The CASUALTY RATES average strength during this phase inside Figure 2 is a display of the casualty rates the Citadel was 615 troops. Casualty rates of participating infantry units before, dur-among the individual companies fighting in ing the Battle of Hue (January 31 -March the Citadel are shown in Figure 8 ; rates of 2), and after the city was retaken. The daily WIA requiring evacuation ranged from 23 wounded rate for these units during the 32 to 35 per 1000 strength per day. days of the battle was 17.5 per 1000 strength, Fluctuations in casualty incidence among and ranged from 1.6 to 45.5. The daily KIA troops during the mopping up phase of the rate was 2.2 and ranged from 0.0 to 9.6. For battle for Hue are shown in Figure 9 . The comparison purposes, casualty rates sus-wounded rate during this seven-day period was 5.8 per 1000 strength per day, while the vice (H&S) companies across the three KIA rate was 0.93. The average strength phases of the battle; rates for H&S compaduring this phase was 2315 troops. Casu-nies are from the mopping up phase exclualty rates among individual companies are sively. Daily rates of wounded among rifle shown in Table 1 . companies exceeded 25 per 1000 strength Figure 10 contrasts casualty rates of rifle/ during the three defined periods of the retank companies with Headquarters & Ser-taking of Hue. DNBI RATES Illness incidence during the battle for lowing the Hue battle. Hue was also examined and contrasted
The lack of major DNBI pulses during with DNBI incidence during the Okinawa the re-taking of Hue is in contrast to large assault and with another period of the Viet-variations in DNBI incidence during the nam Conflict. Figure 11 is a display of the heavy intensity of the Okinawa assault. The daily Disease/Nonbattle Injury (DNBI) rises in DNBIincidenceparalleling increases rates and casualty (wounded and killed) in casualty rates are shown in Figure 12 . rates among the battalions before, during, The DNBI rate over the course of the 90 day and after the Battle for Hue. While there Okinawa operation was 4.56 per 1000 were great fluctuations in the casualty rate strength per day. Figure 13 shows the DNBI during the battle for Hue, the DNBI rate and casualty incidence among infantry batwas relatively stable over the three month talions during peak Marine involvement in period incorporating the Hue fighting. The Vietnam; as with the Hue data, DNBI inci-DNBI rate was 0.92 per 1000 strength per dence was relatively stable over the fourday in the month prior to Hue, 0.98 during month period. The DNBI rate between May the Hue battle, and 0.92 in the month fol-and August 1968 was 1.78. The WIA rates outbreaks of hostilities make it increasingly during the fighting south of the river and likely that United Nations members may within the Citadel were, respectively, 37.9 vote to mount a military operation to make and 44.4 per 1000 strength per day. and enforce peace in one or more of these While a relationship between battle instrife-ridden regions. Given the geographi-tensity and DNBI rates has been previously cal areas where tensions are highest, it is established 5 , there was no increase in DNBI also quite possible that a U.N.-led force incidence during the Hue offensive. Previmay be called upon to drive a recalcitrant ous research suggested that the relationship faction from an urbaa setting.
between battle intensity and DNBI rates The present investigation examined -ates weakened with the tempo of the conflict. of casualties and illness incidence sustained Apparently, increases in battle fatigue cases in the re-taking of the city of Hue during the and illnesses tied to high levels of battleVietnam Conflict. Hue was the cultural field stress are more a function of sustained capital and third largest city in Vietnam. high intensity operation rather than a high During the Tet offensive of 1968, a divi-intensity battle within a light-to-moderate sion-sized force of the North Vietnamese intensity conflict. Army infiltrated and took control of most of Extensive medical resource planning for Hue. Three U.S. Marine battalions and 13 projected casualty and illness incidence South Vietnamese battalions were involved during urban warfare is essential. While the in the fighting to regain the city. U.S. forces demands of treating the DNBI cases among fought house-to-house in the battle south of a U.N. force may be relatively minimal, the the Huong River and would withdraw to the resources required to treat casualties sus-MACV compound at nightfall only to have tained in close-quarter fighting are great.
